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T
he experience of parenthood is
considered to be central to indivi-
dual identity and to the life plan of
most people in most societies. There are
many reasons for wanting children: to
give and receive love, as an expression of
the couple’s unity, to give meaning or
add value to one’s life, for the enjoy-
ment or pleasure of children, to carry on
the family name, to be like other
friends, to give in to family pressure, to
pass on one’s genes to the next genera-
tion, or even for the material benefits
that children can bring, for example for
help in old age or governmental assis-
tance.1 Although some motives are more
common than others and some are
perceived as morally better than others,
there is consensus that when it comes to
having children people have the liberty
to choose when, whether, and how
many children to have. This right to
found a family is considered to be of
such importance that it is recognised as
a basic human right (Article 16 of the
United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; Article 12 of the Human
Rights Act).
LIBERTY RIGHTS
In general, rights are claims to protect a
person’s interests. Parenthood as a
negative or liberty right implies that
other persons or the state should not
interfere with a person’s choice to have
or not have children.2 People who would
limit procreative choice have the burden
of showing that the reproductive actions
at issue would create substantial harm if
followed through.
Rights may also entail obligations.
A right to parenthood simultaneously
creates a duty to care for the children
and a responsibility for their wellbeing.
Although some people would like more
emphasis on parental responsibilities
than on parental rights, this shift would
not help decision making regarding
reproduction. The framework of rights
in the context of reproduction does not
put parents against children. On the
contrary, as in the discussions regarding
maternal-fetal conflicts, maternal deci-
sions are usually to the benefit of the
potential child. People should refrain
from having children when there is a
high risk that the future child will be
seriously harmed, either by genetic or
socioeconomic causes. However, we are
still a large step from promoting coer-
cion or forced intervention in coital
reproduction. There is a consensus that
such intervention would be dispropor-
tional: the benefits (in terms of number
of children and harm prevented) would
not outweigh the massive violation of
privacy and respect for bodily integrity
required to justify restrictions on natural
reproduction.2 This perspective changes
radically when people need medical
assistance for reproduction, as will be
shown.
WELFARE RIGHTS
More problematic is the notion of
parenthood as a positive or welfare
right. Positive rights are claims people
can make on other people or the state
for assistance in the fulfilment of their
interests. Most of the time, a claim
becomes a positive right when society
recognises that claim as a basic need
(and not merely as a wish), is necessary
for the wellbeing of a person. Whether
the desire to have a child is a funda-
mental need is still open for discussion.
In some societies, infertility treatment is
included as part of the essential health-
care package to which every citizen has
access, whereas in other countries,
treatment is not subsidised. Thus the
question becomes whether (a) other
persons (like medical personnel) and/
or (b) the state are under an obligation
to ensure that a person can exercise that
right.
Physician collaboration and
complicity
When people are infertile, the nature of
the whole family building context
changes due to the necessary participa-
tion of third parties—that is, medical
personnel. These people collaborate in
the parental project of the intended
parents and as such become partly
responsible for the welfare of the chil-
dren that results from this collabora-
tion.3 As a consequence, they have an
independent right to determine whether
or not they can justify their collabora-
tion in the parental project of the
individuals concerned. A blind accep-
tance of patient autonomy and an
absolute interpretation of the non-direc-
tivity rule disregards the active partici-
pation of the physicians and their
ensuing responsibility.3 Given the
importance of the realisation of parent-
hood within a person’s life plan, it can
be argued that physicians have a prima
facie obligation to help and should only
refuse collaboration when there are real
and strong indications that the offspring
will be harmed.
State funding
The most obvious implication of the
recognition of parenthood as a positive
right would be the state’s obligation
to provide infertility treatment to its
citizens for free. However, given the
scarcity of healthcare resources, com-
pletely free treatment is unrealistic and
probably unacceptable. A limitation on
the societal contribution is necessary
because otherwise the healthcare bud-
get would quickly usurp the total budget
at the expense of other important social
values (for example, education) and
because the community cannot be
expected to participate so extensively
in the realisation of the personal desires
of individual members. Nevertheless,
depending on the value attached to
parenthood, steps could be taken by
the state to ensure access to infertility
treatment without excessive burdens. In
the last ten years, a shift can be noticed
in society’s attitude towards infertile
people. A growing number of countries
have started systems of state funding.
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and
recently the UK reimburse the costs of
one or more in vitro fertilisation (IVF)
cycles (see, for example, recommenda-
tions of the National Institute of Clinical
Excellence for IVF). Such (admittedly
restricted) systems guarantee greater
access and thus partially avoid unjust
discrimination on the basis of financial
means.
CONSISTENCY AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION
Even if no positive right to medical
assistance for infertility is recognised
and there is no moral obligation for
society to provide assisted reproduction
to all those who request it, there is a
generally recognised right to not be
discriminated against. The principle of
justice demands that like cases should
be treated alike. When a category of
people is excluded from infertility treat-
ment because they possess a certain
characteristic (for example, risk for the
child, reduced life expectancy, reduced
competence) and they are able to show
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that other categories of people who are
accepted as patients possess the same
characteristics to an equal or even
higher degree, the first group may
rightly argue to be unjustly discrimi-
nated against. Justice considerations
would, depending on the attitude
towards other groups, generate a posi-
tive right to infertility treatment for
some groups.
WELFARE OF THE CHILD AND
PROCREATIVE LIBERTY
The most important standard to evalu-
ate the acceptability of procreation is the
‘‘welfare of the child’’ standard. The
Code of Practice of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA) in the United Kingdom, for
instance, stipulates that: ‘‘A woman
shall not be provided with treatment
services unless account has been taken
of the welfare of any child who may be
born as a result of the treatment …’’.4
While the aim of introducing this
standard is laudable and particular
attention should be paid to the welfare
of the child in the decision, in prac-
tice its application is arbitrary and
discriminatory because of the difficulty
of specifying the content.5 Reasons for
denying treatment at present reflect
more the perceived family ideal than
true risk factors for the child. For
example, objections have been made
on the grounds of the sexual orientation
of the parents or their marital status
(married, cohabitating, or single), even
though neither is negatively associated
with child outcomes when confounding
factors like education and socioeco-
nomic factors have been taken into
account.6 Standards like the ideal family
are heavily determined by moral and
religious background theories. As a
consequence, such standards cannot
serve for policy decision making since
they cannot be defended against people
who hold a different world view.
Second, even when risk factors con-
nected to poor(er) child outcomes have
been identified, their predictive utility
has typically been low because others
factors in the child’s upbringing (for
example, sympathetic grandparents,
temperament) can mitigate against the
negative effects of the purported risk
factor.6
A survey of American fertility clinics
showed that the main reasons for
denying treatment were active sub-
stance abuse, ongoing physical abuse,
severe marital strife, severe mental
impairment, and the presence of a
severe personality disorder.7 Although
consensus probably exists on the un-
desirability of these particular charac-
teristics, more controversial criteria are
also used to limit access to treatment
(for example, maternal age, weight).8
The limitations imposed on infertile
people seeking treatment illustrate well
how uninformed external controls can
be. In order to avoid arbitrary and
prejudiced decision making, the criteria
should, as much as possible, be based on
evidence from empirical studies demon-
strating their importance to child and
family outcomes.
CONCLUSIONS
There is little doubt that procreation as a
negative right should be protected. Only
in rare circumstances will active inter-
vention to prevent natural reproduction
be justified. Procreation as a positive
right is more contentious. In general,
affluent western societies seem to move
in the direction of limited state funding
of infertility treatment. As for all other
healthcare interventions, this decision is
a matter of public debate. Equal access
to infertility treatment, apart from the
financial aspect just mentioned, should
however be guaranteed on the basis of
the principle of justice. Whenever cer-
tain categories of persons are denied
access to treatment, a reason should be
given and these reasons should be
consistently applied to all relevant simi-
lar cases. The selective use of arguments
against some groups and not others
shows prejudice and discrimination.
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